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This is not a market — it is a system sustained by conflict
To describe the arms trade in terms of “export performance” is to misread what is happening. This is not a conventional market responding to consumer demand. It is a system driven by insecurity, by escalating threat perceptions, and by the normalization of militarisation. SIPRI data shows that global arms transfers have reached their fastest rate of growth in more than a decade. Europe’s arms imports alone surged by 210%, fuelled by the war in Ukraine and a broader rearmament push across the continent.
This is not a story of growth – it is a story of escalation. The world is not becoming more secure. It is becoming structurally more dependent on weapons.
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Share of Global Arms Exports by Major Suppliers (%)
| Supplier | 2016–2020 | 2021–2025 |
|---|---|---|
| United States | 36.0 | 42.0 |
| France | 8.8 | 9.8 |
| Russia | 21.0 | 6.8 |
| Germany | 5.4 | 5.7 |
| China | 5.5 | 5.6 |
| Italy | 2.2 | 5.1 |
| Israel | 3.1 | 4.4 |
| United Kingdom | 3.3 | 3.4 |
| South Korea | 2.6 | 3.0 |
| Spain | 2.4 | 2.3 |
| Turkey | 0.9 | 1.8 |
From a peace-oriented perspective, these figures are anything but neutral. Ukraine alone accounted for 9.7% of global arms imports, making it the world’s largest arms importer. Europe has emerged as the central theatre of demand. The data reveals a stark reality: what appears as growth in one column is often destruction in another.
[2]
The US consolidates dominance, Russia retreats
The United States is not just leading – it is entrenching its position. Its share of global exports has climbed to 42%, with arms deliveries reaching 99 countries. Europe now accounts for the largest share of US exports, followed closely by the Middle East. This is not simply trade; it is geopolitical architecture in motion.
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Russia’s decline is equally telling. Its export share has fallen from 21% to 6.8%, with overall exports dropping by 64%. The reasons are structural: war consumption, sanctions, and constrained production capacity. A former superpower in arms exports is now increasingly marginalised in a market it once helped define.
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Meanwhile, countries such as France, Italy, Israel and South Korea are expanding their roles, capitalising on demand generated by instability. The market is not diversifying out of balance – it is reorganising around it.
The real story lies with the buyers
Export rankings obscure a more critical question: who is buying, and why? SIPRI data shows that arms exports are highly concentrated among a limited number of clients, often tied to regional conflicts or strategic alliances rather than open market dynamics.
The United States’ key clients — Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, and Japan – reflect its reach across three major geopolitical theatres. France’s exports cluster around India, Egypt, and Greece. Russia remains heavily dependent on India, while China’s exports are overwhelmingly tied to Pakistan.
Top 3 Clients of Major Arms Exporters (%)
| Supplier | 1st Client | % | 2nd Client | % | 3rd Client | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States | Saudi Arabia | 12.0 | Ukraine | 9.4 | Japan | 8.9 |
| France | India | 24.0 | Egypt | 11.0 | Greece | 10.0 |
| Russia | India | 48.0 | China | 13.0 | Belarus | 13.0 |
| China | Pakistan | 61.0 | Serbia | 7.0 | Thailand | 5.0 |
| Turkey | Pakistan | 16.0 | UAE | 12.0 | Ukraine | 8.4 |
These overlaps are not incidental. They reveal a system where the same conflict zones and rivalries generate demand across multiple suppliers. The arms trade does not follow globalisation – it follows confrontation.
Shared clients, shared risks
India appears as the top client for multiple exporters. Pakistan anchors both Chinese and Turkish exports. Ukraine sits at the centre of a vast supply network spanning several Western countries. These patterns illustrate how arms flows are embedded within geopolitical competition – and how conflict itself becomes a stabilising force for the market.
Ukraine’s position is particularly stark. As the world’s largest arms importer, it demonstrates how war drives demand not just on the battlefield, but across global supply chains. Rising export figures in one country often correspond directly to destruction elsewhere.
Dependency is the hidden architecture of the arms trade
In many cases, a majority of exports are concentrated among just three clients. South Korea, Russia, and China all rely heavily on a narrow customer base. This concentration creates structural vulnerability – not only economic, but political.
| Supplier | Top 3 Total (%) |
|---|---|
| South Korea | 85.5 |
| Russia | 74.0 |
| China | 73.0 |
| Turkey | 36.4 |
| United States | 30.3 |
This is often described in terms of “security cooperation.” In practice, it produces interdependence, leverage, and long-term geopolitical entanglement. The more concentrated the market, the less resilient it becomes.
Turkey: rising visibility, shaped by war-driven demand
Turkey’s share of global arms exports has doubled, reflecting a growing presence in the international market. Its primary clients — Pakistan, the UAE, and Ukraine – position it within key regional dynamics.
At the company level, the expansion is even more pronounced. Baykar increased its arms revenues by 94% in 2022, while Roketsan recorded a 17% rise. Both companies benefited from increased demand linked to the war in Ukraine. Turkey’s trajectory illustrates a broader trend: growth in the arms sector is increasingly tied to active conflicts rather than long-term stability.
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As the arms trade expands, the space for peace contracts
This could be presented as a story of economic success – rising exports, expanding markets, technological growth. But that framing obscures a deeper reality. The global arms trade is not expanding in spite of instability, but because of it.
The data makes this clear: escalating imports in Europe, the centrality of Ukraine, and the concentration of clients among a few strategic states all point in the same direction. The system is not neutral. It is structured around conflict.
The figures may appear technical. The consequences are not.

